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Abstract. One of the most important areas in the robotics industry is the devel-
opment of robots capable of working in hazardous environments. As humans cannot
safely or cheaply work in these environments, providing a high level of robotic func-
tionality is important. Our work in this area focuses on a fault detection method
known as analytical redundancy, or AR. In this paper we discuss the application
to a hydraulic servovalve system of our novel rigorous nonlinear AR technique. AR
is a model-based state-space technique that is theoretically guaranteed to derive
the maximum number of independent tests of the consistency of sensor data with
the system model and past control inputs. Conventional linear AR is only valid for
linear sampled data systems. However, our new nonlinear AR (NLAR) technique
maintains traditional linear AR’s mathematical guarantee to generate the maximum
possible number of independent tests in the nonlinear domain. Thus NLAR allows
us to gain the beneﬁts of AR testing for nonlinear systems with both continuous
and sampled data.
1 Introduction
The usefulness of robots in hazardous situations is highly dependent on their
reliability [8–10,30]. Chemicals and radiation can damage robotic compo-
nents, and many environments can be made more hazardous by actions of
a malfunctioning robot. As humans usually cannot enter hazardous environ-
ments to repair or remove a failed robot, such failures can be very dangerous
and costly. Thus, our team has investigated reliability issues for robots exten-
sively [17–19,23]. A fault detection method known as analytical redundancy
[4,16], or AR, is the focus of this particular paper. AR is a model-based
technique that derives the maximum number of independent tests from the
state-space control model of the system. These AR tests monitor the con-
sistency of sensor data with the linearized system model and past control
inputs. The tests determine whether the system is performing nominally, or
is deviating from the desired plan and presumably under fault conditions.
Our group has used the linear version of the AR technique successfully on
electrical robotic systems in the past [30], and has also applied our nonlin-
ear version to nonlinear hydraulic systems such as the Rosie robot discussed
below.
In previous papers [19,23], we have discussed the derivation through linear
AR of a suite of model based tests for the default sensor package for hydraulic
wheel actuators, and introduced an approximate technique for using AR eﬃ-
ciently in nonlinear systems. Some of these tests are comparison of the actual
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system response to control inputs to the predicted response indicated by the
model. These show that AR clearly monitors known behaviors of the sys-
tem. The other tests uncovered by the linear AR analysis reﬂect higher order
state interdependencies, as discussed later and in [27]. These tests give us
important additional information about the system that we might not have
normally examined.
These previous tests are all based at least partially on linear models of the
system. However, the hydraulic valve and motor system behavior is highly
nonlinear in nature, which leads to a degradation in the performance of the
AR method. Linear AR can miss or improperly detect faults in this situation,
so nonlinear AR techniques are highly desirable. We now show our results for
rigorously extending the linear AR tests into the nonlinear realm.
2 Nonlinear Analytical Redundancy
Let us begin by deﬁning a nonlinear state-space system with states, inputs,
and outputs.
x˙(t) = f(x(t)) +
∑
i
g
i
(x(t)) · u(t)
y(t) = h(x(t))
(1)
The corresponding linear system model is:
x˙(t) = Ax(t) + Bu(t)
y(t) = Cx(t) (2)
NLAR uses the left null-matrix of the observability:
[
Ω
(
f, g
)] [O(f, g)
]
= 0 (3)
where the model-based observability O(f, g) is calculated using stan-
dard methods using the model equations for linear systems, and our modi-
ﬁed ‘triangular’ method [16,21] for nonlinear systems. The  refers to this
method, which reduces to the standard method in the linear case) The linear
observation space is the rows of the matrix
[
C, CA, CA2 . . .
]
. For nonlin-
ear systems, the Lie Derivative operation Lfhi is used to combine the vector
functions f, g
i
with elements of h, and the observation space is generated from
appropriate combinations of Lkhi, k ∈
{
f, g
1
, g
2
, . . .
}
. For more details, see
[15,16,21,22].
However, if the system is observable it is also possible to express the
observability in terms of sensor readings y and control inputs u [15,16,22] in
addition to the state and model. This observability will be referred to as the
‘dynamically derived observability,’ or ODD(y, u). The important aspect of
this formulation is the explicit dependence of every element of it on the input-
output behavior of the system as it is functioning at the time the observability
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is calculated. By taking the product of ODD(y, u) with the left null-matrix
from equation 3 we can generate the suite of NLAR residual tests R:
[
Ω
(
f, g
)] [ODD(y, u)
]
= R = [0] (4)
As Ω (f, g) is derived from the system equations, while the input-output
observability matrix depends on the recent sensor readings and inputs, if
the system is observable the result of the above matrix multiplication can be
expressed as a set of equations dependent on the known quantities of y and u .
If the system is behaving in accordance with the nominal model ODD(y, u)
will be as similar to O(f, g) as measurement error and noise allow, and
equation 4 will generate near-zero values [15,16,22]. However, if the system
model has become inaccurate due to a fault changing the characteristics of the
system, nonzero values will be generated, allowing the fault to be detected.
In fact, since the observability space by deﬁnition spans all that can be
observed about the system using the current model, it can be shown that
NLAR is guaranteed to react to any observable discrepancy [15,16,22]. The
basis vectors of the observability space generated from system data (model
ODD(y, u)) span a space dependent on the current behavior of the system
that spans the observability space if the model is correct. The null-space of the
model derived observability space Ω
(
f, g
)
spans the space of information you
shouldn’t be able to see if the system is performing according to the model.
Projecting the basis onto the null space instantly reduces a complex stream
of sensor and input data into residual signals that show all the deviations
from the expected model, and only those deviations.
NLAR test results can only be zero if the system equations are modeling
the system behavior correctly. Any discrepancies, such as those that result
from sensor noise, manifest as bias or noise in the NLAR output. However,
given a good system model, most faults will cause deviations between the
system and the model much greater than the diﬀerence caused by modeling
inaccuracies. Faults will appear as large nonzero NLAR signals, thus allowing
NLAR to be used as an eﬀective tool for fault detection [15,16,20,22].
The standard linear AR is shown to be a special case of NLAR in [16].
The linear technique described in [4] requires a linear system model like that
described in equation 2. This can cause signiﬁcant extra bias and noise in
the linear AR tests if the system has nonlinear characteristics. NLAR can of
course solve this problem.
2.1 The NLAR Algorithm
Although the full derivation of the NLAR method described above is too
extensive to reproduce here, the following algorithm [16,21,22] summarizes
the necessary steps in deriving a suite of NLAR tests:
i. Determine the triangular nonlinear observability O and its left null Ω.
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ii. Determine the nonlinear dynamically derived observability ODD.
iii. Find the rank, rj(nonlin), of each observability sub-matrix in the observ-
ability “matrix” in ∇ODD. Keep rj(nonlin)+1 rows in each sub-vector.
iv. Apply the NLAR equation to ﬁnd the test residuals R : ΩODD = R.
v. The number of independent NLAR tests, NNLAR, can be determined by
the equation NNLAR =
m∑
j=1
(rj(nonlin)) + (m− n) . Use this equation to
determine how many independent tests exist. Delete the redundant tests.
Full details of this method are discussed in [16,21,22].
2.2 Other Related Work
Considerable work has been done using the concept of nonlinear observers in
place of AR [3,13]. In fact, it has been shown that AR and observer based
methods are equivalent in the linear case [24]. However, the proof in [24] is
only applicable to linear systems, so the nonlinear observers are not neces-
sarily the same as nonlinear AR. Additionally, the nonlinear observer based
method [13] lacks the span guarantees of NLAR.
Zhirabok and Preobragenskaya have presented work with nonlinear AR
test residuals based on observer theory [33]. Nonlinear test residuals are gen-
erated by following an algorithm for restating the model equations in terms
of inputs ui and outputs yi. Unfortunately this method does not use the
observability to maintain the guarantees that make AR so desirable.
Wu¨nnenberg and Frank have investigated methods for using dynamic
thresholding with linear robotic AR test residuals to compensate for vari-
ous modeling inaccuracies [11,32]. Instead of adapting the AR tests to the
nonlinear systems, this work takes the practical approach of developing a
system that runs in parallel to the AR system, predicts when the model-
ing inaccuracies will likely be large, and increases the thresholds on the AR
residual tests appropriately.
Starosweicki and Comtet-Varga have produced some interesting work de-
scribing rigorous nonlinear AR limited classes of nonlinear systems [28,29].
This work discusses several methods of rigorously developing various AR-
like test residuals without actually using the nonlinear observability. This
work considers the spanning issue, but is limited by its neglect of the core
observability issues of AR.
Isidori and De Persis have derived a geometric residual generator using
nonlinear observability [7]. These residuals are similar in concept to those
generated by AR in that they use the null space of the observability to test
the system behavior. However, they are limited to checking for faults where
both the disturbance and fault dynamics are known well enough to model
accurately, making span guarantees much more troublesome [12,25]. This
limits the Isidori approach to detecting well known and well modeled faults,
while AR and NLAR are geared to detect all deviations from the model.
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3 NLAR Applied to a Hydraulic System
The Rosie mobile worksystem [1,5,26] discussed in this section was the initial
motivation for the study of nonlinear analytical redundancy. The nonlineari-
ties introduced by hydraulic ﬂow through components such as servovalves are
a signiﬁcant issue when dealing with hydraulic robots and systems [2,6,14].
These nonlinearities led us to investigate the application of modiﬁed AR
fault detection techniques to deal in an approximate manner as shown in Ap-
pendix 9 with the nonlinear hydraulic system [18–20,23]. Eventually, we left
the approximation limitations of our early techniques behind with increas-
ingly rigorous notions of nonlinear analytical redundancy.
3.1 The Rosie Mobile Worksystem
The Rosie Mobile Worksystem is a tele-robotically operated, hydraulically
driven robot, which provides locomotion and a four degree-of-freedom heavy
manipulator arm which can be equipped with various tools and robot ma-
nipulators. Figure 1 is a photograph of the Rosie worksystem working at the
CP-5 reactor. As described in the literature [1,5,26], the robot consists of
two main components or modules. The ﬁrst module is a locomotor or mobile
platform upon which is mounted the second module, a heavy manipulator.
The locomotor module supports and transports the manipulator, and sup-
plies it with power and control/communications. The locomotor consists of
a central spine, or body core, upon which are attached front and rear drive
wheel assemblies, an electronics enclosure, a hydraulic power supply system,
a hydraulic enclosure for ﬁlters and valving, and a tether system. The loco-
motor platform is 198 cm wide, 107 cm high and 290 cm long (78 x 42 x 114
in.), supports an overall machine weight of 6,350 kg (14,000 lb.), and has a
maximum speed of 0.6 m/s (2.0 ft/s).
Each wheel is powered individually by means of a geared, piston-type
hydraulic motor, and is independently steered by means of a rotary actuator
above that wheel. The front wheels are mounted on beams that can extend to
provide additional stability when the manipulator arm is extended, as shown
in Figure 2. The rear wheels are mounted on a pivoting beam for steering
purposes.
The HPSS consists of a 45 kW (60 hp) supply which provides 114 l/min.
(30 GPM) at 20.7 MPa (3,000 psi) for all robot operations. Electrical power
and control are provided through a 61 m (200 ft) tether which is wound on
a powered reel at the rear of the unit.
The heavy manipulator module supports and positions the tools that ac-
tually perform the decontamination and dismantlement (D&D) functions.
Shown with a fully-extended boom in Figure 2, the heavy manipulator per-
forms the functions of waist rotation, shoulder pitch, outer forearm extension,
inner forearm extension, and wrist pitch. The hardware to execute each of
these functions is very similar and consists of a ﬂow servovalve, an actuator,
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Fig. 1. The Rosie Mobile Worksystem at the CP-5 Reactor. (Courtesy of Sharon
Curd at Oak Ridge National Labs)
and ﬂuid components (tubing, ﬁttings, etc.). The shoulder pitch and forearm
extension functions have piston-cylinder actuators and the waist and wrist
rotation are achieved through rotary actuators.
3.2 The Hydraulic Testbed and Fault Simulation
Failure modes, eﬀects, and criticality analysis (FMECA) and fault tree based
reliability analysis by researchers working with Rosie determined that the
hydraulic wheel actuator subsystem was a vital component for the reliabil-
ity of the mobile platform. A failure of a wheel mechanism might prevent
the removal of the chassis from the reactor work site. This led to a project
where the goal was to develop eﬀective data analysis procedures (in our case
AR-based fault detection) for hydraulic wheel actuators and then implement
them on a testbed system located at Foster-Miller Inc., a company with con-
siderable experience with hydraulic systems. The reliability of existing and
future robots could then be enhanced by the results of this project.
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Fig. 2. Rosie with manipulator arm extended. (Courtesy of Sharon Curd at Oak
Ridge National Labs)
The testbed was a hydraulic motor controlled by a hydraulic servovalve.
(This was the main nonlinear component of the system.) The speciﬁc compo-
nent selected for the test program was the hydraulic wheel motor from Rosie,
a Black Bruin Model 404-080-2111 from Valmet Power Transmission Inc. It
has a radial piston design and has a maximum power rating of 35 kW (47
hp), a maximum output speed of 185 rpm and can deliver a torque of 2990
Nm at 250 bar (2205 ft-lb at 3600 psi). This motor was capable of driving
a wheel directly and therefore accepting a substantial radial load, the exact
value of load depending on the axial location of the load with respect to the
motor.
The concept for the test rig itself is shown in Figures 3 and 4. A hydraulic
motor powered by a HPSS was mounted on a machine bed. The output shaft
was loaded radially by means of an adapter and a hydraulic jack assembly.
Load was applied to the motor by means of an identical motor, used as
a pump. The pump loading device was connected to the motor through a
ﬂexible coupling and diﬀered from the motor in not having a hardened shaft
and not having the “freewheeling with springs” option. The pump was fed
176 Leuschen, Walker and Cavallaro
through a separate hydraulic supply consisting of a low-pressure pump, cooler
and reservoir. Load was controlled by means of a throttling valve, with a relief
valve to prevent overpressure. Table 1 shows a listing of the motor-servovalve
Machine Base
Angle
Bracket
Hydraulic Motor
Radial Loading
DeviceHydraulic
Jack
Hydraulic Pump
Flexible
Coupling
Simulated Wheel
Angle
Bracket
Output
Shaft
Fig. 3. Hydraulic test rig schematic. (Courtesy of Foster-Miller)
Motor
P(supply)=ps
θ(k)
pl(k)
Spool Valve
Sticking
Servovalve
Fig. 4. Conceptual hydraulic system.
system faults investigated, along with the planned installation methods.
Problems with the servovalves focused on open windings and sticking of
internal valve components. Open winding faults were simulated by inserting
a relay in series with the winding. The relay was actuated by means of a bit
output of the data acquisition board. This allowed a simple simulation of the
fault in software.
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Component Fault Installation Method
Servovalve Open winding Relay
Servovalve Sticking valve Change control proﬁle in software
Tachometer Failed tachometer Make input zero in controller
Hydraulic motor Ruptured line Tee ﬂow to separate tank
Table 1. Faults for the Foster-Miller hydraulic testbed.
A sticking valve was simulated by altering the software control proﬁle for
the valve. For example, a new open loop control proﬁle was substituted for the
standard PID closed loop control algorithm. The new algorithm incorporated
stick-slip behavior as needed to simulate the sticking valve.
Hydraulic systems are clearly vulnerable to many faults that electrical sys-
tems do not experience and are much harder to model due to their inherently
nonlinear nature. However, a hydraulic system has considerable advantages
as an actuator in a radioactive environment, as such systems are rugged and
powerful, and much less likely to produce dangerous sparks than an electrical
system. Therefore, it is sensible to use one and simply put some extra time
and energy into ensuring the hydraulic system is adequately monitored.
3.3 The Mathematical System Model
Begin by deﬁning the terms used in the model.
Notation:
• A, B, and C are the canonical discrete time state-space system matrices
• Bm is the viscous damping coeﬃcient
• Ctm = cem + cim represent total, external, and internal leakage, respec-
tively
• dm is the volumetric displacement of the motor
• Jt is the inertia of the motor and load
• Kf ,kq and kc are valve ﬂow coeﬃcients
• M = kc + Ctm is a generalized pressure coeﬃcient
• pl and p(k) are the (continuous and discrete) pressure drop across the
motor as measured by the sensors
• ps is the hydraulic power supply; nominal pressure of 3000 PSI
• Q is the net ﬂuid ﬂow into the spool valve
• R1 through R5 are nonlinear AR tests
• t is the continuous time variable, k the discrete time variable, ∆t is the
time step
• Tg is the torque generated by the motor
• Tl is the load torque
• uv and u(k) are the (continuous and discrete) servovalve positions
• vt is the volume of ﬂuid within the motor
• y(k) is the state vector
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• βe is the bulk modulus of the hydraulic ﬂuid
• θm and θ(k) are the (continuous and discrete) position of the motor shaft
- the derivative of this is measured by a velocity sensor
• ρ is the hydraulic ﬂuid density.
The following model equations are standard for hydraulic systems [27,31]:
Tg = pldm = Jtθ¨m + Bmθ˙m + Tl, (5)
Q = uvKf
√
2(ps − pl)/ρ = dmθ˙m + (cim + cem)pl + vtp˙l4βe (6)
The state-space control model uses the following state vector:
x =


θ
θ˙
pl

 . (7)
The second and third state variables are instrumented, but the ﬁrst (θ) is
not. The nonlinear control system formed by these assumptions is as follows:
x˙ = f(x) + g(x)u, (8)


θ˙
θ¨
p˙l

 =


0 1 0
0 −Bm/Jt dm/Jt
0 −4βedm/vt −4βeCtm/vt




θ
θ˙
pl


+


0
0
(4βeKf/vt)
√
2(ps − pl)/ρ

uv
, (9)
y = Cx, C =
[
0 1 0
0 0 1
]
, y =
[
θ˙
pl
]
(10)
The intractability of nonlinear systems such as the one described above
makes fault detection techniques like AR more important. The behavior of
a nonlinear system is harder to predict and control, resulting in reduced
safety and reliability, which in turn makes fault detection more prominent.
However, model-based fault detection techniques require good models to be
eﬀective, and traditional linear AR is generally unsatisfactory for systems
with signiﬁcant nonlinear components. Figure 5 shows the modeling error
for a standard linearization of the Rosie wheel actuator. As this error is not
accounted for in linear AR, but is modeled in the NLAR method, the ﬁgure
also shows the expected improvement in going from linear to nonlinear AR.
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Fig. 5. Error due to linearization for hydraulic servovalve.
4 Nonlinear Analytical Redundancy for the Rosie
Wheel Actuator
Now we apply our nonlinear analytical redundancy (NLAR) technique to the
Rosie subsystem described above. This will allow us to avoid the mathemati-
cal errors caused by linearization, as shown in Figure 5. To begin, we calculate
the grouped observability vector O :
O =








c1x
Lfc1x + Lgc1xu
Lffc1x + Lfgc1xu + Lgfc1xu + Lggc1xu2
c2x
Lfc2x + Lgc2xu
Lffc2x + Lfgc2xu + Lgfc2xu + Lggc2xu2








,
O =




























θ˙
−Bmθ˙/Jt + dmpl/Jt


(
B2m/J
2
t +−4βed2m/Jtvt
)
θ˙
+
(−Bmdm/J2t +−4βedmCtm/Jtvt
)
pl
+(4βedmKf/Jtvt)
√
2(ps − pl)/ρ u



pl{
(−4βedm/vt)θ˙ + (−4βeCtm/vt)pl
+(4βeKf/vt)
(√
2(ps − pl)/ρ
)
u
}



(
4Bmβedm/Jtvt + 16β2edmCtm/v
2
t
+
(
8β2edmKf/v
2
t
)√
2/ρ(ps − pl)u
)
θ˙
+
(−4βed2m/Jtvt + 16β2eC2tm/v2t
+
(
8β2eKfCtm/v
2
t
)√
2/ρ(ps − pl)u
)
pl
(−16β2eKfCtm/v2t )
(√
2(ps − pl)/ρ
)
u
+
(
−16β2eK2f/ρv2t
)
u2































. (11)
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Note the nonlinear sub-observability matrices ci∇O have no terms con-
taining θ, so the system is rank two and only three terms are needed in each
Cj . This also means four independent NLAR tests are expected.
Now calculate the null-matrix Ω:
ΩO =






Ω11 θ˙ 0 0 0 0
Ω21 0 θ˙ 0 0 0
Ω31 0 0 θ˙ 0 0
Ω41 0 0 0 θ˙ 0
Ω51 0 0 0 0 θ˙






O = 0 , (12)
where:
Ω11 =
Bm
Jt
θ˙ +
−dm
Jt
pl,
and
Ω12 =
(−B2m
J2t
+ 4βed
2
m
Jtvt
)
θ˙ +
(
Bmdm
J2t
+ 4βedmCtmJtvt
)
pl
+
(−4βedmKf
Jtvt
√
2(ps − pl)/ρ
)
u
,
Ω13 = −pl,
Ω14 =
4βedm/vtθ˙ + 4βeCtm/vtpl
+(−4βeKf/vt)
√
2(ps − pl)/ρ u ,
Ω51 =
(−4Bmβedm/Jtvt − 16β2edmCtm/v2t
+
(−8β2edmKf/v2t
)√
2/ρ(ps − pl)u
)
θ˙
+
(
4βed2m/Jtvt − 16β2eC2tm/v2t +(−8β2eKfCtm/v2t
)√
2/ρ(ps − pl)u
)
pl
+
(
16β2eKfCtm/v
2
t
)√
2(ps − pl)/ρ u + 16β2eK2f/ρv2t u2
.
Then calculate ODD:
ODD =








y1(t)
y˙1(t)
y¨1(t)
y2(t)
y˙2(t)
y¨2(t)− (4βeKf/vt)
√
2(ps − y2(t))/ρ u˙(t)








. (13)
Then simply apply the NLAR equation:






Ω11 θ˙ 0 0 0 0
Ω21 0 θ˙ 0 0 0
Ω31 0 0 θ˙ 0 0
Ω41 0 0 0 θ˙ 0
Ω51 0 0 0 0 θ˙














y1(t)
y˙1(t)
y¨1(t)
y2(t)
y˙2(t)
y¨2(t)− (4βeKf/vt)
√
2(ps − y2(t))/ρ u˙(t)








= 0. (14)
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to get the NLAR tests.
R1 = −y˙1(t)− Bm
Jt
y1(t) +
dm
Jt
y2(t) (15)
R2 =
−y¨1(t) +
(
B2m/J
2
t − 4βed2m/Jtvt
)
y1(t)
+
(−Bmdm/J2t − 4βedmCtm/Jtvt
)
y2(t)
(16)
R3 = −y2(t)y1(t) + y1(t)y2(t) (17)
R4 =
−y˙2(t)− 4βedmy1(t)/vt − 4βeCtmy2(t)/vt
+(4βeKf/vt)
√
2(ps − y2(t))/ρ u
(18)
R5 =
−y¨2(t)
+
(
4Bmβedm/Jtvt + 16β2edmCtm/v
2
t
+
(
8β2edmKf/v
2
t
)√
2(ps − y2(t))/ρ u
)
y1(t)
+
(
−4βed2m/Jtvt + 16β2eC2tm/v2t
+
(
8β2eKfCtm/v
2
t
)√
2(ps − y2(t))/ρ u
)
y2(t)
− (16β2eKfCtm/v2t
)√
2(ps − y2(t))/ρ u− 16β2eK2fu2/ρv2t
+(4βeKf/vt)
√
2(ps − y2(t))/ρ u˙
(19)
Note that R3 is trivial, so the expected number of independent NLAR
tests is generated. R1 and R4 correspond to the model equations. R2 and R5
correspond to the convolved ﬁrst derivatives of the model equations. This is
a common result of AR and NLAR analyses, and a reassuring one. The tests
generated relate directly and intuitively to the system being analyzed.
5 Results
The following results were generated by applying nonlinear analytical redun-
dancy techniques to recorded experimental data from the hydraulic testbed
described previously. In the case of the Rosie wheel actuator, the NNAR1
tests discussed in Appendix 9 and in previous papers [18–20,23] are the same
1 It turns out that the spans of linear and nonlinear observability spaces for this
sytem are similar enough that previously derived approximate techniques [19,23],
created by us to allow application of linear AR to nonlinear systems, were correct
for this particular system. (This is something of a co-incidence, and not true for a
generaleralized nonlinear system.) For this speciﬁc case the approximation used
in the NNAR technique is exact. The nearly nonlinear AR (NNAR) technique
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as the NLAR tests. While this is a useful coincidence validating previously
derived approximate test results, the most important aspect of the following
results remains that they validate the NLAR technique using physical testbed
data.
Each of the following result sections shows all four of the NLAR test
residuals for both a baseline data run (light grey) and a run with an injected
fault (black). As NLAR test residual magnitudes are a somewhat arbitrary
function of basis choice during derivation, it is important to note that the
magitude of the plot along the y-axis is important only in comparison with
other runs. It is thus the shape and magnitude of the residual relative to the
baseline test run that is indicative of faulty or fault-free conditions.
The hydraulic engine speed and the load on the system (in terms of PSI
across the load pump) are shown with each set of residuals.
5.1 Servovalve, Open Winding Fault
This fault was modeled by physically opening the winding on the hydraulic
servovalve and inserting a relay to short circuit the control solenoid. The fault
is detected easily by NLAR -the onset and duration of this fault is clear in
all AR tests - large spikes in two of the NLAR test residuals (R1 and R5)
show the fault the instant after it appears. Large steps in the other two tests
are almost as fast. This is because the open winding acts like a large step
input that is not accounted for in the model, degrading the accuracy of the
model greatly in a short time period. This naturally provokes a strong AR
response, which allows us to determine the system is operating under faulty
conditions.
5.2 Sticking Wheel Motor Servovalve Fault
In the simulation of this fault, the system was ramped from zero speed to
a speed of 5 RPM (equal to the fault free run) while the control input was
intermittantly set to zero to simulate sticking. This fault is evident on all of
the AR tests, although R1 and R5 show the clearest results. The system starts
out close to the model but rapidly departs from model-following behavior if
the control system tries to apply a nonzero control input while the servovalve
is ‘stuck.’ This causes the spikes in the NLAR tests shown in Figure 5.2 that
make the fault easily detectable.
is an approximate but useful method developed early in the course of this work
to deal with the nonlinearities of the Rosie hydraulic actuator [18–20,23]. This
method is not truly nonlinear in nature, however, as it uses the linearized system
model to derive the AR tests. (The approximate NNAR and PLAR methods are
brieﬂy described in Appendix 9.)
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Fig. 6. Servovalve, open winding fault run.
5.3 Loss of Speed Feedback (Tachometer) Fault
The failed sensor invalidates the control loop if the commanded velocity is
nonzero. The sensor reports zero angular velocity, so the controller tries to
increase the speed by providing more power, quickly leading to a runaway
system. (The testbed had a limiting device to prevent damage when this hap-
pened.) NLAR detects this as a deviation from the model-expected behavior
almost instantly - the control inputs and sensor values disagree. This leads
to the clear error signals seen in the ﬁgure.
6 The Importance of Model Accuracy
It bears repeating that the success of the NLAR fault detection technique is
limited by the accuracy of the system model. The successful tests described
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Fig. 7. Sticking wheel motor servovalve fault run.
in Section 5 are notable in that they are detecting faults that cause large
and immediate deviations from the system model described in Section 3.3.
All faults are not so tractable. Consider the following fault, which represents
a leak in the motor-valve system, shown in ﬁgure 9.
Why does NLAR not generate a clear and unambiguous signal as it did
for the other three faults? Investigation shows that as NLAR is a model
based fault detection algorithm, it is limited by the accuracy of the model.
The NLAR test residuals shown were applied as a post-analysis to an in-
completely documented system. While the model presented in Section 3.3 is
a good mathematical representation of this hydraulic system, several of the
constants in the system are only approximately determined or not as constant
as one might desire. For example, the supply pressure ps is approximated as
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Fig. 8. Loss of speed feedback (tachometer) fault run.
a constant 3000 PSI. This is a rough approximation made necessary by the
lack of a pressure sensor to give this value directly. Similarly, many of the
parameters describing the liquid behavior of the hydraulic ﬂuid are actually
functions of the oil temperature. Several other constants are catalog values
of uncertain accuracy. For most error based control applications, these ap-
proximations are acceptable. However, for model based fault detection, every
inaccuracy limits the resolution of the tests. In the case of the leak fault
shown, the resolution of the NLAR tests is too coarse to detect the tiny error
caused by the steady leakage of a small percentage of the hydraulic ﬂuid. We
are conﬁdent that better modeling and proper instrumentation of the system
could overcome this and make NLAR capable of detecting quite such leak
faults. For many sensitive systems, better modeling is a small price to pay
for improved reliability, and NLAR is a good choice for such systems.
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Fig. 9. Leak in motor-valve system fault.
7 Conclusions
Analytical redundancy is a model based fault detection technique, and thus
requires an accurate system model to be eﬀective. Previous AR theory has
been limited to linear system models; this is a serious problem in a nonlinear
world. Advances in nonlinear control theory have opened the door to the
nonlinear realm. This allows us to apply the AR method rigorously to most
nonlinear systems without losing any of the valuable theoretical assurances of
complete coverage inherent to the AR method. The Rice and Clemson group
has developed such theoretically robust nonlinear AR techniques.
Nonlinear AR fault detection is a useful monitoring method for hydraulic
systems such as Rosie that must operate in hazardous environments. Better
fault detection for hydraulics will reduce the costs associated with failures of
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such systems in the workplace by minimizing damage done by and to faulty
systems as well as the amount of time wasted by false alarms. Safety and reli-
ability are critical for success of many operations in hazardous environments,
and this work represents the ﬁrst detailed examination of nonlinear AR fault
detection for these types of hydraulic robot systems.
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9 Appendix: Approximate Approaches to NLAR
One way to deal with a system model that is nonlinear enough to change
considerably as it moves through the workspace is to create several sets of
AR tests for the system linearized about state vectors located in each region
of interest. In the local region each set would be more accurate than a general
linearization of the control equations for the entire workspace. An example of
this technique, and the improvement it brings, is illustrated below in Figure
10. In this case, generated for the hydraulic servovalve system, the pressure-
valve position workspace in which the ﬂow equation is nonlinear is divided up
into nine equal regions. The model equation is linearized about a point at the
center of each and normal AR tests are derived. (Due to the symmetry of the
system, only four linearizations are needed in practice.) During operation,
the AR test used is the one that was linearized about a point closest to
the current position, with interpolated transitions near the borders of each
region.
Figure 11 shows the results from a fault free run and a faulty run (the fault
was a large leak) of PLAR tests on a simulated hydraulic servovalve [18,19].
The fault free run shows how PLAR minimizes the drifting away from the
model errors of pure linear AR. Before the test residual can drift far from
the point about which it was linearized, the system transitions into another,
more appropriate AR test linearized about a point closer to the actual state
of the system, leading to a saw-toothed residual about the nominally correct
zero value. The results in a test run with a large leak fault added to the
hydraulic system show that this saw-tooth is about an order of magnitude
smaller than the fault signature.
Nearly nonlinear analytical redundancy is a natural outgrowth of PLAR.
Although each PLAR partition uses a diﬀerent linearization of the control
equations, the diﬀerent linearizations all share the same basic form - they
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Fig. 11. PLAR fault free (left) and faulty (right) test results for simulated hydraulic
servovalve.
are tangents to the control system at the point of linearization. This means
that the AR tests generated by the diﬀerent linearizations will be, in essence,
tangents to some more accurate nonlinear AR test. It is reasonable to ap-
proach this test by dividing the workspace into many closely packed regions
and taking appropriate linearizations. In the limit of inﬁnitely small regions,
this is a nonlinear AR test! However, there is a much simpler method of ﬁnd-
ing these tests. Recall that AR tests tend to be combinations of the model
equations, sensor comparisons, and their derivatives. By performing linear
AR on a linearized system and identifying the relationship between the AR
residual tests and the control model and sensors, it is possible to ﬁnd nonlin-
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ear AR tests by simply duplicating this relationship to the nonlinear control
system and sensors! For example, if the AR tests for the linear system are
the linearized model equations, their ﬁrst derivatives, and direct sensor com-
parisons between the linearized sensors, the nonlinear model equations, their
ﬁrst derivatives, and comparisons of the nonlinear sensors can be used as
NNAR tests.
Why, then, are these tests referred to as merely “nearly nonlinear” rather
than “fully nonlinear?” Unfortunately, as they use the linear observability
matrix they are still using linear approximations of the observability null-
space, Ω. It can be shown that this is diﬀerent than the nonlinear null-space;
in fact the two can have a diﬀerent rank. The AR guarantees of testing for all
of the possible model deviations eﬃciently are thus not valid in PLAR and
NNAR. Any AR method that doesn’t use the full nonlinear observability
space will suﬀer from this drawback. This is what makes fully nonlinear AR
using the nonlinear observability space so desirable, and relegates PLAR and
NNAR to secondary roles. These methods do not require extensive nonlinear
calculation to use, but they are essentially approximations of the complete
NLAR technique.
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